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Abstract
Relying on the economic theory of real property, commentators argue that
patent law is better suited to a property rule regime than a liability rule
system. The underlying assumption is that ex ante incentives for innovation
are best promoted by enabling patent holders to negotiate licenses against the
backdrop of an injunction. By contrast, judicially determined damage
remedies systematically undervalue innovation. However, recent judicial
developments have started to deny injunctions in patent infringement cases
in favour of awarding damages, making it appear that patent law will now be
increasingly governed by liability rules. This article reflects on this trend by
considering the case of patent market failure. It argues that many of the
preconditions that work against liability rules similarly affect property rules
and private bargaining. Patent market failure is caused by difficulties in
valuing (and pricing) innovation, establishing the boundaries of patents and
resolving the externalities involved in patent licensing. Patent market failure
strengthens the case for liability rules that provide follow-up innovators
access to patents, while eliminating the detrimental effect of the
anticommons.
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1 Introduction
The distinction between property rules and liability rules, set forth by the
groundbreaking article ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View from the Cathedral’, is well established as one of the most
prominent analytical tools in legal scholarship.1 In this article on the
protection of entitlements, Judge Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed
have stimulated a new generation of scholars to cross boundaries between
the different fields of law and reach beyond settled legal terminology in
order to recognize similarities and analyze functional differences among
legal systems and varying areas of the law. Unifying concepts, such as
property and liability rule protection,2 provide highly valuable instruments
that can be used to critically examine remedial opportunities. Likewise, in
the field of intellectual property law the property-liability rule framework
has inspired a range of illuminating scholarship and lively debates over the
appropriate legal protection for information goods. 3
The distinction between liability and property rules has proved to be
instrumental in explaining the role of collective rights organisation,4
analyzing the conditions amenable to compulsory licensing,5 determining the
1 G. Calabresi and A.D. Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089.
2 Id. at 1092 (‘Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing
to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a
liability rule.’).
3 See generally on the question whether property rules are more or less likely than
judicially administered liability rules to encourage bargaining to efficient licensing
outcomes, R.D. Blair and T.F. Cotter, ‘An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in
Intellectual Property Law’ (1998) 39 William and Mary Law Review 1585. For a
critical examination of the general presumption in favor of injunctive relief, see D.L.
Burk, ‘The Trouble with Trespass’ (2000) 4 Journal of Small and Emerging
Business Law 27 at 53 (in the Internet context); A. Kozinski and C. Newman,
‘What's So Fair About Fair Use? (1999) 46 Journal of the Copyright Society of the
USA 513 at 525-527 (in the context of copyright law).
4 R.P. Merges, ‘Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organisations’ (1996) 84 California Law Review 1293 at 1303–
1309 (arguing that the strong property rule protection in copyright law prompted
authors and users to contract out of a property rule into a liability rule regime
enforced by copyright collectives, for instance with blanket licenses).
5 R.P. Merges, ‘Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property’ (1994) 94
Columbia Law Review 2655.
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appropriate protection of incentives to innovate,6 and examining the
relationship between various intellectual property regimes, to give a few
examples.7
In this article, I contribute to this literature by applying the liability-
property rule toolkit, firstly to describe an emerging shift towards liability
rule solutions in US patent law and, secondly, to analyse the causes of this
liability rule trend in patent law more generally. I argue that, despite the
current trend of applying property rules to analyse intellectual property
rights, several factors of increasing importance in the field of technological
innovation suggest that the property rule approach to patent disputes is
becoming increasingly costly. Specifically, I argue that boundary costs,
fragmentation costs, and the costs of bundling necessities have substantially
increased the burden on patent licensing markets. By contrast, nuanced
liability-based alternatives are able to ensure access to science without
hurting incentives to innovate.
This article unfolds as follows. Part 2 describes the traditional
property rights/property rule approach to intellectual property. Part 3
provides a concise summary of the recent judicial trend that has broadened
the application of liability rules in patent law. Part 4 examines the
transaction costs involved in patent licensing markets. Part 5 concludes by
considering the advantages inherent in using liability rule defaults for
follow-up innovations.
2 The property rule paradigm in patent law
To a high degree, the equitable remedy of injunction has dominated the law
of intellectual property.8 For instance, when a court deems an author’s
copyright has been infringed upon by another’s unauthorized derivative
work, the copyright holder may exercise his or her right to halt the
publication and dissemination of the infringing work.9 Similarly, patent
holders may prevent non-licensed uses of their underlying technology in
6 See generally on remedial choices in patent law M. Schankerman and S.
Scotchmer, ‘Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Intellectual Property’ (2001) 32
Journal of Industrial Economics 199.
7 J.H. Reichman, ‘Legal Hybrids between the Patent and Copyright Paradigm’
(1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 2558.
8 Id. at 2667 (‘All familiar with the IPR field recognize the strong presumption in
favor of injunctions.’).
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (enjoinment in civil cases) and 17 U.S.C. § 506 (a) (criminal
cases).
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subsequent technologies.10 Because of the strict liability nature of patent
infringements, the patentee will in effect enjoin the unauthorized
manufacturing, use, sale, or importation by the infringer.11
The traditional legal emphasis on property rule protection fits well
within a general tendency to equate intellectual property law with the law
governing property more generally.12 Spurred by the intellectual prominence
of the ‘law and economics’ movement, concepts behind laws governing real
property have firmly established the paradigm of private property rights in
intellectual property.12 The underlying concepts in the economic theory of
real property justify granting strong rights to intellectual property owners in
order to internalise positive externalities and prevent free riding.
Leading commentators have argued that patent law is better suited as
a property rule regime than a liability rule system.13 Strong remedial
protection promotes ex ante incentives for innovators and enables patent
holders to license their patent to users and follow-up innovators. Arguing
from the assumption that patent rights are relatively well defined, law and
economics scholars have generally operated on the expectation that patent
holders and follow-up innovators will have little trouble negotiating licenses
against the backdrop of an injunction. By contrast, judicially determined
damage remedies (such as ex post compulsory licenses) may misjudge the
value of the intellectual property or the injuries caused by a patent
infringement. Specifically, the objection to liability rule protection is that
courts will not only inaccurately identify damages, but that the deviation will
10 Patent right is the right to exclude others from using your patented innovation. See
J. Bessen and M. Meurer, Patent Failure (Princeton: Princeton Universty Press
2008).
11 R.P. Merges, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case
of Blocking Patents’ (1994) 62 Tennessee Law Review 75 at 77: ‘The basic rule [in
patent law] is that the rightholder has an almost absolute right to obtain an injunctive
remedy against the infringer.’ See also Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718
F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983) (‘[W]ithout the right
to obtain an injunction, the right to exclude granted to the patentee would have only
a fraction of the value it was intended to have, and would no longer be as great an
incentive to engage in the toils of scientific and technological research’).
12 This is not met with unequivocal approval. Some commentators argue that
information goods should not a priori be reward absolute exclusion rights; for
Congress awards only so much protection as to ensure ‘the progress of the Arts and
Sciences’. See M.A. Lemley, ‘Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding’
(2005) 83 Texas Law Review 1031.
13 See R.D. Blair and T.F. Cotter, ‘An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in
Intellectual Property Law’ (1998) 39 William and Mary Law Review 1585; R.P.
Merges, and J. Duffy, Patent Law and Policy (San Francisco: Matthew Bender
2002).
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lead to a systematic undervaluation of innovation.14 Patent owners, on the
other hand, are acutely aware of what it will take to recoup their initial
investments through licensing revenues. Also, by satisfying the non-obvious
requirement of patent law,15 a patent holder demonstrates ingenuity and a
unique expertise regarding the technology. This places him or her in the best
position to evaluate the contribution and decide the appropriate price for
using the patent in a follow-up innovation. 16
To summarise, by emphasizing the ex ante incentive for the
innovator and the reliance on private bargaining, law and economics
scholarship operates on the presumption that property rules (injunctions)
may be preferred in the field of patents.
3 The liability rule shift in patent law
Recently a new paradox has emerged, alongside the scholarly trend of
conceiving intellectual property as real property. As the property right
paradigm gains ground in scholarly commentary, recent judicial
developments in patent law have begun to cast doubt upon the quintessential
stick in a property owner’s bundle of rights: the right to exclude by way of
injunction.17 In eBay v. MercExchange, the United States Supreme Court
vacated the Federal Circuit's long-standing policy of automatically enjoining
infringing defendants in patent cases.18 In effect, the Court abrogated the
well-established property rule entitling a patent holder to an absolute right to
exclude and replaced it with a conditional property rule, which awards
protection for patents based on the outcome of a balancing test completed at
trial. In the underlying dispute, MercExchange owned a patent for a business
model which allowed private buyers and sellers to transact via an online
market place that is regulated by ‘a central authority to promote trust among
participants.’19 MercExchange attempted to license its patent to Ebay, the
renowned Internet auction site; however, no deal was subsequently reached.
14 R.A. Epstein, ‘A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules’
(1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2091 (would-be purchasers of a property right
invariably prefer liability rules).
15 35 U.S.C. § 103.
16 Along these lines, the veto right of patent holders in future innovation has been
compared to a mining right in innovation. See E.W. Kitch, ‘The nature and function
of the patent system’ (1977) 20 The Journal of Law and Economics 265.
17 See in the context of takings law, R.A. Epstein, ‘Takings, Exclusivity and Speech:
The Legacy of PruneYard v. Robins’ (1997) 64 University of Chicago Law Review
21 at 22 (‘[I]t is difficult to conceive of any property as private if the right to
exclude is rejected’).
18 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
19 Id. at 390.
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MercExchange filed suit against Ebay, claiming Ebay had infringed upon its
patent. Instead of continuing the long tradition of using property rules to
regulate patent law, the Supreme Court determined MercExchange did not
have an absolute right to enjoin Ebay from using patented innovation
without a license. The court held that: ‘The decision to grant or deny
permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district
court .…’20 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, reasoned that: ‘The
Patent Act itself indicates that patents shall have the attributes of personal
property … including, presumably, the provision that injunctive relief “may”
issue only “in accordance with the principles of equity.”21 Specifically, the
Court provided a discretionary, four-prong test for lower courts to apply.
Thus, following this decision, a plaintiff seeking a permanent
injunction must establish that he or she can meet all four requirements set
forth by the test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) he has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate
for that injury; (3) considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest
will not be disserved by a permanent injunction.22 On remand, the District
Court completed the four-part analysis and held, inter alia, that the harm
caused to MercExchange was not irreparable, money damages could justly
compensate for the wilful infringement, the ‘balance of hardships favoured
neither patent owner nor competitor,’ and that the public interest was slightly
disfavoured by a permanent injunction.23 The absence of injunctive relief
that may result from the application of this four-part test creates, in effect, a
compulsory licensing regime based on a liability rule, under which
infringement is permitted at a price determined by a court.24
Since the decision in Ebay, several district courts have denied
requests for permanent injunctions where a patent holder has failed to meet
all four prongs of the test. A prominent example of such a denied request can
be seen in z4 Technologies v. Microsoft,25 in which plaintiff z4 owned the
20 Id. at 391.
21 Id. at 392 (quoting 35 U.S.C. §283).
22 Id. at 390.
23 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007).
24 G.D. George, ‘What is hiding in the Bushes? Ebay’s Effect on Holdout Behavior
in Patent Thickets’ (2007) 13 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law
Review 557.
25 434 F. Supp. 2d 438, 439 (E.D. Tex. 2006); See also Voda v. Cordis Corp., No.
CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006) (denied plaintiff’s
motion for permanent injunction where a plaintiff introduced evidence that the
defendant’s infringement caused harm to a third-party exclusive licensee. The Court
held that the evidence proffered failed to meet the irreparable harm component of
the test because a plaintiff must show he, himself, was harmed.); See G. Barten,
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patent for software used by Microsoft in Office and Windows. While a jury
verdict found that Microsoft had infringed upon z4’s patent, the court denied
the plaintiff’s motion for permanent injunction, reasoning that monetary
damages serve as adequate compensation where the protected property is
only a small part of the defendant’s product.
Similarly, many post-eBay district court decisions have denied
injunctions in patent infringement cases in favour of awarding damages, thus
making it appear that patents will now be increasingly governed by liability
rules.26 While the critical examination of Ebay is underway,27 this article
attempts to explain the weakened link between patent rights and property
rule protection. As I argue in more detail below, the shift to a liability rule
system in patents is best understood when one considers the relative impact
of property and liability rules on the access to innovation and the cumulative
effect of patent rights on follow-up innovation.
4 Patent market failure
Commentators in the field of intellectual property rights now fully recognize
that innovation is characterised by an increasing degree of composite
innovation. Seen from this viewpoint, the progress of science depends on
every innovator standing on the shoulders of his or her predecessors.
However, in order to make use of patented innovations, a patent
license must be obtained. Each patent provides an inventor with the
‘Permanent Injunctions: A Discretionary Remedy for Patent Infringement in the
Aftermath of the Ebay Decision’ (2007) 16 University of Miami Business Law
Review 1.
26 Of course, by now means does this trend signify an exclusive shift to liability
rules. Many permanent injunction motions in patent infringement claims continue to
pass muster under the four factor test. See for example, Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., 2006 WL 3813778 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 27, 2006). Also, even though courts now unanimously apply the four-part test
from Ebay to motions for permanent injunctions, courts are ‘split as to whether the
presumption of irreparable harm applies in motions for preliminary injunctions.’
Hologic, Inc. v. Senorx, Inc., 2008 WL 1860035 at 14 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2008).
27 See for example, Kozinski and Newman, above n. 3 at 525-527 (Arguing that
both injunctive relief and fair use should be rejected and copyright owners should be
entitled only to actual damages.); See also M.A. Lemley and P.J. Weiser, ‘Should
Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?’ (2007) 85 Texas Law Review 783
(identifying situations where property rule protection invariably enjoins the
underlying right as well as noninfringing conduct). But see P.M. Schoenhard, ‘Who
Took My IP?—Defending the Availability of Injunctive Relief for Patent Owners’
(2008) 16 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 187.
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exclusive right against all unauthorized uses of the patented product.28 Non-
patent holders are constrained not only from manufacturing, but also from
using, selling, or importing the resource without prior consent from the
patent holder.29 A patentee’s exclusive right extends to identical inventions,
regardless whether these inventions were copied from the patent and
irrespective of any good faith intentions on the part of the patent infringer. In
addition, the doctrine of ‘equivalent patents’ extends the control rights of the
patentee beyond the terms of the patent description. Under this doctrine, the
holder may exclude the development of all subsequent, similar, non-
identical, useful inventions. In effect, a property rule creates a setting where
any subsequent innovator is at risk of being enjoined from using already
patented innovations.
As discussed above, property-rights oriented scholars have
traditionally presumed that the transaction costs involved in patent license
negotiations are negligible compared with the information costs involved
when courts apply compulsory licenses (liability rule protection) to patents.
Accordingly, property rules provide better footing for consensual agreements
in the area of patents, without having courts impose prices on innovation.
This conventional wisdom is outdated. Firstly, a number of recent articles
have discovered ways in which liability rules do indeed enhance
negotiations.30 Others have explored ingenious modifications to liability rule
regimes that improve the effectiveness of bargaining under liability rule
protection.31 Secondly, as I argue in more detail in this part, transaction costs
in private bargaining are higher than regularly assumed. Properly conceived,
successful patent license negotiations depend on an accurate assessment of
(1) the value of innovation, (2) the boundaries of patents on the underlying
innovations, and (3) externalities involved in patent license agreements.
28 See generally M. Adelman and others, Cases and Materials on Patent Law (St.
Paul: West Group 2002).
29 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), 271(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). This stands in contrast
to most other areas of intellectual property law, where only some unauthorized uses
are prohibited. Consider for instance the exceptions in copyright law, such as the fair
use and first-sale doctrines, 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-12. Also, wrongful intent is not a
condition for infringement.
30 L. Kaplow and S. Shavell, ‘Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 713 (providing importance nuances to
the claimed bargaining advantage of property rules).
31 I. Ayres and E. Talley, ‘Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade’ (1995) 104 Yale Law Journal 1027 at 1031-1033 (arguing
that liability rules make possible credible signaling among entitlement holders); A.
Bell and G. Parchomovsky, ‘A Theory of Property’ (2005) 90 Cornell Law Review
531 (suggesting that liability rules may be helpful in overcoming strategic obstacles
to successful negotiations).
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Together, these factors significantly increase the probability of patent market
failure.
4.1 Innovation uncertainty
In the particular case of patent licenses, there are several factors that
complicate the licensing process between a patent holder and an improver or
follow-up inventor. These stem from the problem of assessing the value of
any given innovation, the level of product complexity, the difficulty of
sharing information regarding the innovation at the pre-patent stage, and
from cognitive limitations.
Firstly, research into patentable inventions entails a significant
degree of ex ante uncertainty.32 It is unduly hard to predict inventions or
estimate their value with any degree of success.33 A historic example that
demonstrates the difficulty of obtaining an accurate estimation of the
expected value of a present invention is IBM’s underestimation of the future
market for home computers.34 Such uncertainty increases the reluctance of a
follow-up innovator to license the follow-up invention. The uncertainty over
the value of any given innovation may extend to both the original innovation
that is the subject of a potential license by a follow-up innovator and the
licensor’s follow-up invention. The uniqueness of each respective invention
prevents parties from accurately estimating the value of both a license and
32 What I mean when referring to uncertainty is the difficulty of perfectly predicting
ex ante how whether any given innovative activity will be successful ex post.
33 M.A. Lemley, ‘The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law’
(1997) 75 Texas Law Review 989 at 1049 and n. 280 (referring to the literature that
illustrates the computational problems firms have in the management of intra-firm
inventions: S.A. Lippman and others, ‘Heterogeneity Under Competition’ (1991) 29
Economic Inquiry 774; M.E. Porter, ‘The Structure Within Industries and
Companies’ Performance’ (1979) 61 The Review of Economics and Statistics 214;
D.J. Teece, ‘Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration,
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy’ (1986) 15 Research Policy 285).
34Merges, above n. 11 at 86 n. 41, citing N. Rosenberg, Exploring the Black Box:
Technology, Economics and History 220 (1994): ‘The computer was regarded by its
inventors as a purely scientific device ....’ (quoting B.G. Katz and A. Phillips, ‘The
Computer Industry’ in R.R. Nelson, Government and Technical Progress (New
York: Pergamon Press 1982) 162, 171). See also J. Elster, Explaining Technical
Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983) at 111; J. Mokyr, The Lever
of Riches: Techonological Creativity and Economic Progress (New York: Oxford
University Press 1990) at 154; C. Freeman, The Economics of Industrial Innovation
(London: Frances Pinter 1982, 2nd ed.) at 75.
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the follow-up innovator’s innovation.35 The reasons for this are that it is
often hard to place separate values on relative contributions of the pioneer
and improver, and that there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the
likely profitability of the overall combined technology.36
Secondly, these high levels of uncertainty regarding the value of a
patent make a prospective licensee more cautious and less generous when
negotiating a price for a patent license. When both parties’ expectations
diverge too widely, no licensing agreement will be reached.37 Also, as
experimental research has demonstrated, uncertainty has a magnifying effect
on the price asked for a good or service.38 Moreover, the bargaining range in
patent license negotiations is further reduced by the general tendency of
researchers, commonly referred to as attribution bias, to overvalue the
contribution of their own research compared to that of others.39
Finally, the information problem is even more complex in the course
of license negotiations that involve potential rather than actual improvers.40
In such a context, parties face what is known as Arrow’s information
35 Highly detailed contracts might ameliorate the problem, but integrating all
possible contingencies into contracts is costly and not all eventualities are
foreseeable.
36 Merges, above n. 11.
37 On the dynamics of bargaining breakdown, see generally R. Cooter, ‘The cost of
Coase’ (1982) 11 Journal of Legal Studies 1; R. Cooter and others, ‘Bargaining in
the Shadow of Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior’ (1982) 11 Journal of
Legal Studies 225.
38 In fact, in cases of uncertainty, the anticommons pricing effect is amplified. The
results in Depoorter & Vanneste suggest that licensors ignore the expected value of
the licensee’s project, and instead focus on the upper range of profitability of
surplus. Willingness to accept seems to be anchored to a proportion of the maximum
profitability, rather than a proportion of the expected benefits of the project. In one
particular experiment the total uncoordinated reservation price of all licensors was
seven times above the expected value of the project. In the experiment this created a
serious gap between the amount licensor’s holders were asking, on the one hand,
and what a third-party entrepreneur could reasonably offer, on the other hand. See B.
Depoorter and S. Vanneste, ‘Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: Pricing in
Anticommons Property Arrangements’ (2007) 13 Journal of Law, Economics and
Public Policy 59.
39 See M.A. Heller and R. Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research’ (19980) 280 Science 698 at 698.
40 Lemley, above n. 33 at 1051. On the interaction between initial inventors and
improvers in science, see, e.g., S. Schotchmer and J.R. Green, ‘Novelty and
Disclosure in Patent Law’ (1990) 21 RAND Journal of Economics 131; S.
Schotchmer, ‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law’ (1991) 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives 29; J.R. Green and S.
Scotchmer, ‘On the division of Profit in Sequential Innovation’ (1995) 26 RAND
Journal of Economics 20.
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paradox.41 The actual improver possesses valuable information that he would
like to disclose to the patent owner in exchange for money.42 However, the
exchange cannot occur before the original owner is in a position to evaluate
the information. At the same time, however, under prospect theory,43 the
patent owner will be free to use the patented information once he finds out
what the improvement consists of.44
4.2 Uncertain patent boundaries
The real property-property rule analogy to patents, as described above,
operates based on the assumption that patent rights are relatively well
defined. As recent scholarship has illuminated, this assumption does not hold
true. In this respect, a patent is very different from a parcel of land. While
the extent of a parcel of land can be surveyed with relative ease, ascertaining
the boundaries of a patent is much more demanding. That is because the
boundaries of a patent are determined by individual patent right holders’
exclusionary rights as described-claimed in a patent application.
41 K.J. Arrow, Collected Papers of Kenneth H. Arrow: The economics of information
vol. IV (Cambridge: Belknap Press 1984) at 222-224. Arrow’s paradox encapsulates
the notion that imperfect information of another’s utility function inhibits the ideal
Coasian bargaining model.
42 Merges, above n. 11 at 81. Arrow’s paradox also provides a case for the existence
of blocking patents.
43 Under prospect theory, the patent system provides incentives but is based on the
ability of intellectual property ownership to drive the efficient use of inventions and
creations through licensing. The patent system rewards not future investors but
instead insures ‘further commercialization and efficient use of as yet unrealized
ideas by patenting them, just as privatizing land will encourage the owner to make
efficient use of it.’ See Lemley, above n. 33 at 1046.
44 To a certain extent, this dilemma is recognized in intellectual property law
doctrine. The balance between the protection of the right of present innovators and
future talents features strongly in the ‘doctrine of improvement’ of patent law. What
is improvement and what is imitation? Too much freedom to improvers (imitators?)
will discourage future development, while granting too much protection to the
original parties may halt development of new products. Id. (arguing that patent
doctrines of blocking-patents and the reverse doctrine of equivalents should apply
equally to the realm of copyright law, because the various imperfections in the
licensing markets, e.g., transaction costs and strategic behavior, will discourage
copyright improvements): ‘Some improvements fall within the scope of the
preexisting intellectual property right, either because of an expansive definition of
that right or because economic or technical necessity requires that the improver hew
closely to the work of the original creator in some basic respect. Here, the improver
is at the mercy of the original intellectual property owner, unless there is some
separate right that expressly allows copying for the sake of improvement’ (footnotes
omitted). Id. at 991.
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This process is much more elaborate than that of establishing the
physical boundaries of land. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the
scope of a patent is ascertained at different stages, by different decision
makers. When a patentee argues that his patent has been infringed, he or she
needs to demonstrate that the infringer’s patent or use falls within the
boundaries of the claimant’s prior, protected patent. The initial decision on
patent scope is made by the patent claimant.45 This decision is subject to the
scrutiny of the Patent Office, which verifies whether the claimed invention
meets the statutory requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, utility and
enablement.46 If a patent infringement is litigated, these aspects are re-
evaluated by the court.
Secondly, determining the boundaries of a patent is a difficult
process, which involves a mixture of difficult questions of fact and
interpretations of (often vague) law. The difficulties in determining the exact
scope of a patent are illustrated by the notoriously high costs of patent
litigation. Moreover, the exact meaning or interpretation of the language in a
claim may change over time. Thirdly, while information on land boundaries
is always available in public records, patent owners can hide from the public
claim language that defines the exact boundaries of a patent.47 Finally, the
sheer amount of patents complicates the establishment of patent boundaries.
It is important to recognize that there is ‘no simple “one-to-one” mapping of
products and property rights.’48 As Merges notes:
A commercially viable product will often be assembled from a number of
components. One or more of these components may be covered by IPRs [intellectual
property rights], but it is not always true that a complete product will be covered by
one, and only one, comprehensive IPR. Complex, multi-component products are the
45 Almost universally a patent claim consists of (i) a specification of the invention
that describes the problem and solution-process which allows others to reproduce
the invention; and (ii) the claim, which specifies the application’s proposed scope of
the invention and allows delineation of the invention from the existing state of the
art.
46 See, respectively, 35 U.S.C §§ 102(a), (e), (g); 103; 101; and 112. Similarly,
European patent applications must meet the substantive requirements of novelty (not
part of the state of the art), involve an inventive step (not obvious to a person skilled
in the art), and must be susceptible to industrial application. See Convention on the
Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 52, 13 I.L.M. 271. For a summary, see
G. Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2002) 325
n.68.
47 Bessen and Meurer, above n. 10 at 62-64.
48 R.P. Merges, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics’
(1997) 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 1857 at 1859 (critiquing the assumption implicit
in the neo-classical economic model that ‘one, and only one, property right covers
the entirety of a marketable product,’ id., while pointing out, more generally, the
important role of institutions in the coordination of intellectual property rights).
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norm in many industries (e.g., autos and consumer electronics), and individual
patents often cover only a single component or subcomponent ...[M]ulti-component
works are far from uncommon.49
The difficulties inherent in determining the boundaries of patents obviously
drive up the costs of license negotiations. For, as Mark Lemley states: ‘[I]n
order for the parties to divide the gains from trade, they must know what
those gains are’.50 Partly because of how difficult it is to establish the
boundaries of what is to be purchased in a license agreement, transaction
costs in technology licenses amount to 20 per cent of the total value of the
underlying license.51
4.3 Patent externalities
If a subsequent innovator has to obtain several licenses, the successful
negotiation of patent license agreements is further complicated by the
existence of externalities among the different patent right holders. If many
different prior innovations play a role, a tragedy of the ‘anticommons’52 may
49 Id.
50 Lemley, Economics of Improvement, above n. 33 at 1055.
51 Id. at 1053-1054.
52 Originally coined by F.I. Michelman, ‘Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law’ (1967) 80 Harvard Law
Review 1165, Michael Heller revitalized the concept of anticommons property. In an
article on the transition to market institutions in contemporary Russia, Heller
discussed the intriguing prevalence of empty storefronts. Stores in Moscow were
subject to underuse because there were too many owners (local, regional and federal
government agencies, Mafia, etc.) holding rights of exclusion. As employed by
Heller, the definition of the anticommons as ‘a property regime in which multiple
owners hold effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource,’ provides a powerful
tool for property theory. See M.A. Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’ (1998) 111 Harvard Law Review
621 at 639. For a classic treatment of the danger of over-fragmentation, see, e.g.,
M.A. Heller, ‘The Boundaries of Private Property’ (1999) 108 Yale Law Journal
1163 (recognizing a ‘boundary principle’ in property law that purports to prevent
excessive fragmentation and criticizing the Supreme Court’s violation of the above
principle by way of protecting increasingly minimal property fragments in a recent
number of cases). See also M.A. Heller and R. Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research’ (1998) 280 Science 698
(cautioning against the stationary effects of upstream patents on downstream patent
markets); D. Lichtman, ‘Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies’
(2000) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 615 (identifying externalities in emerging
markets of platform technology and peripheral sellers); B. Depoorter and F. Parisi,
‘Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation’ (2002) 21
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emerge, whereby patent rights are overpriced and consequently remain
underused.53
Consider the following formal illustration by Schulz et al.54 If two
firms each hold a patent in a technology that requires the use of both
(complementary) patents, any third party desiring use of the technology will
need to obtain access to both patents. Suppose that there is a continuum of
such third-party firms where each firm is characterized by its willingness (w)
to pay for the use of the two patents. Let w be uniformly distributed across
[0, 1]. Suppose the patent-holding firm 1 asks a price pi for a license to use
its patent. Hence the price to be paid to both patent-holding firms is p1 + p2.
All third party firms with a willingness to pay at least such amount will ask
for a license from both firms. Given the assumption that on the distribution
of the potential licensees the demand for patents is 1 – (p1 + p2), patent-
holding firm 1 has a profit of p1 (1 – (p1 + p2)).
There is an analogous expression for firm 2. The decision to set a
price for an equilibrium value of both prices is 1/3 such that both licenses
cost 2/3. Suppose now that both patents are in the hands of just one firm that
demands a price of P for a license on both patents. Then the profit of this
firm will be P (1 – P).
This profit will be maximized at P = ½. Hence, fragmentation raises
the price for both licenses. This induces some firms not to employ the
technology. The result of underuse of a patent derives from a positive
externality due to complementary features of the various patents. Neither of
the two patent holders captures the full value of their individual decisions for
the third party. As such, the various patent holders are faced with a strategic
problem, given the interdependence of their decisions. These strategic costs
increase the transaction costs involved in bundling the various patent rights
required by law to allow the follow-up innovation to proceed. For potential
International Review of Law and Economics 453 (upholding the usefulness – from a
strategic costs perspective – of fair use in copyright law in the digital era); T. J.
Miceli and C.F. Sirmans, ‘Partition of Real Estate; or, Breaking Up Is (Not) Hard to
Do’ (2000) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 783 (examining the modern statutory
remedy that allows courts to order forced sale of an undivided land under joint
ownership).
53 J. Buchanan and Y.J. Yoon, ‘Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons’
(2000) 43 Journal of Law & Economics 1, demonstrating that the price charged by
complementary monopolists is higher than that of a single agent monopolist); N.
Schulz, F. Parisi and B. Depoorter, ‘Fragmentation in Property: Towards A General
Model’ (2002) 158 Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics 594
(Proposing that the anticommons deadweight losses are an increasing function in the
following three factors: (a) number of property fragments; (b) degree of
complementarity of such fragments in subsequent uses; and (c) independence of the
pricing of such inputs by the fragmented property owners).
54 Schulz, Parisi and Depoorter, above n. 53, at 600-601.
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improvers, the transaction costs involved may well outweigh the perceived
value of obtaining a license on a prior patent or the follow-up innovation. In
the advent of these transaction costs, improvers might choose to forego
improvements ex ante.55
To summarise: While property-rule entitlements may provide an
incentive for truly alone-standing pioneering innovations, they may
complicate innovations involving original combinations of existing
(patented) technology. Overall, this threatens to reduce the rate of
innovation.
5 Concluding remarks
As Calabresi and Melamed’s classic article explains, courts should rely on
property rules when transaction costs are low and parties can negotiate to
reach an efficient outcome.56 By contrast, if such bargaining is unlikely to
succeed, a liability rule enables courts to attempt to achieve efficiency, even
in the absence of bargaining. For example, patent market failure might be
overcome by imposing compulsory licenses,57 for instance by applying
conditional property rule regimes, such as those introduced in the Ebay
decision.
Much of the concern about under-compensation in cases of non-
voluntary licensing may well be misplaced. Firstly, as several recent studies
indicate, courts regularly unduly deter patent infringements by applying
55 Lemley, above n. 33 at 1055.
56 I. Ayres and J.M. Balkin, ‘Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Beyond’ (1996) 106 Yale Law Journal 703 at 706 n. 9 (‘[L]egal
scholars have interpreted Calabresi and Melamed to be saying that property rules are
more efficient when transaction costs are low.’); J.E. Krier and S.J. Schwab,
‘Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light’ (1995) 70 New
York University Law Review 440 at 451 (deeming a ‘virtual doctrine’ the principle
that ‘[w]hen transaction costs are low, use property rules; when transaction costs are
high, use liability rules’); Merges, above n. 5 at 2655 (‘Ever since Calabresi and
Melamed, transaction costs have dominated the choice of the proper entitlement
rule, with a liability rule being the entitlement of choice when transaction costs are
high.’).
57 See J.H. Reichman and C. Hasenzahl, ‘Non-voluntary Licensing of Patented
Inventions’ in UNCTAD/ICTSD, Capacity Building Project on Intellectual
Property and Sustainable Development (2003) available at
<http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/CS_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf>
(providing an historical perspective, reflections on the TRIPS framework, and a
discussion of licensing practices in Canada and the United States).
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enhanced damage awards.58 Secondly, while it might be correct that courts
are ill equipped to estimate the value of a patent license, uncertainty and
information costs might similarly trouble private bargaining among patent
holders and potential licensees. Finally, liability rules provide follow-up
innovators access to prior patents, thereby eliminating some of the
detrimental effects that anticommons tragedies have on the progress of the
sciences.
58 T.F. Cotter ‘An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damages and Attorneys’ Fees
for Willful Infringement’ (2004) 14 Federal Circuit Bar Journal 291; United States
Federal Trade Commission (2003), To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of
Competition and Patent Law and Policy, available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; K.A. Moore, ‘Judges, Juries, and
Patent Cases – An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box’ (2000) 99 Michigan Law
Review 365.
